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Access to Charter Justice
Hon. Robert J. Sharpe*
The Canadian legal system faces an access to justice crisis.1 While
our system of justice delivers quality results, it often does so at a cost
that shuts the courtroom door to all but the well-to-do. How does the
access to justice crisis affect Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2
litigation? In this paper, I examine two areas of critical importance to
access to Charter justice, standing and costs, where there appears to be a
willingness to rethink long-established procedural rules that were
primarily designed for the litigation of civil claims between private
litigants in pursuit of money remedies.

I. STANDING
Ordinarily, a litigant must have a direct legal interest to sue where a
public right is at issue. The common law restricts standing to individuals
who have suffered “special damage”, either because they assert a private
right that coincides with the public right, or because they claim some
damage particular to themselves from the interference with the private

*
Justice, Court of Appeal for Ontario. I wish to acknowledge the assistance of two
people in the preparation of this paper. My law clerk, Matthew Parker, provided me with valuable
research assistance. Professor Kent Roach kindly provided me with the galley proofs of the
portion of the new edition of his text on Charter remedies dealing with the issue of costs from
which I have borrowed freely and to which the reader is referred for more detailed consideration
of the issues: see Kent Roach, Constitutional Remedies in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Irwin
Law, 2013) [hereinafter “Roach”].
1
Action Committee on Access to Justice in Civil and Family Matters, “Report of
the Access to Legal Services Working Group”, Canadian Forum on Civil Justice (May 2012),
online: CFCJ-FCJC.org <http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/Report%20of%20the%
20 Access%20to%20Legal%20Services%20Working%20Group.pdf>.
2
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
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right.3 Traditional standing rules discourage public interest litigation.
Public interest litigants are seen as “busybodies” who clutter court
dockets with frivolous cases or cases that lack an adequate adversarial
foundation and that unduly burden scarce judicial resources.4
However, since 1975, courts have recognized that the traditional
restrictive standing rule must yield to the fundamental principle that a
question of constitutionality cannot be immunized from judicial review
because there is no one with sufficient interest to challenge an impugned
law.5 As Laskin J. put it in the seminal case: “it would be strange and,
indeed, alarming, if there was no way in which a question of alleged
excess of legislative power, a matter traditionally within the scope of the
judicial process, could be made the subject of adjudication”.6
The courts have traditionally looked to three factors in determining
public interest standing:
(1) whether there is a serious justiciable issue as to the law’s invalidity;
(2) whether the litigant is affected by it directly or has a genuine interest
as a citizen in the validity of the legislation; and, until recently,
(3) whether there is “no other reasonable and effective manner in which
the issue may be brought before the Court”.7
The third factor proved to be a significant hurdle. Standing was refused
if the constitutional challenge could be brought by an individual litigant,
without much regard for the practical realities. For example, in Canadian
Council of Churches v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration),8
a public interest group was refused standing to challenge legislation
governing the refugee determination process despite practical constraints
that stood in the way of a direct challenge by individual refugee

3
Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council (1902) 87 L.T. 564, [1903] 1 Ch. 109, at p. 114
(Ch. Div.), revd [1903] 2 Ch. 556 (C.A.), revd [1906] A.C. 1 (H.L.).
4
Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against Violence
Society, [2012] S.C.J. No. 45, [2012] 2 S.C.R. 524, at paras. 26-28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Downtown
Eastside”].
5
Thorson v. Canada (Attorney General), [1974] S.C.J. No. 45, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thorson”]; Nova Scotia (Board of Censors) v. McNeil, [1975] S.C.J. No. 77,
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 (S.C.C.).
6
Thorson, id., at 145.
7
Canada (Minister of Justice) v. Borowski, [1981] S.C.J. No. 103, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575,
at 598 (S.C.C.).
8
[1992] S.C.J. No. 5, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 236 (S.C.C.).
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claimants. The tone of the judgment is revealing and reflective of
traditional skepticism towards public interest litigants:
... It would be disastrous if the courts were allowed to become hopelessly
overburdened as a result of the unnecessary proliferation of marginal or
redundant suits brought by a [sic] well-meaning organizations pursuing
their own particular cases certain in the knowledge that their cause is all
important. It would be detrimental, if not devastating, to our system of
9
justice and unfair to private litigants.

More recently, however, the decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex
Workers United Against Violence Society10 reflects a significant shift in
attitude and liberalization of standing in Charter cases. Writing for the
Court, Cromwell J. held that the three factors were not to be “treated as
hard and fast requirements or free-standing, independently operating
tests” but rather to be “assessed and weighed cumulatively” and
“applied in a flexible and generous manner that best serves” the
underlying purposes of limiting standing.11 Most significantly, he
reformulated the third factor by replacing the requirement that there be “no
other reasonable and effective manner in which the issue may be brought
before the Court” with the much more flexible test of “whether, in all
the circumstances, the proposed suit is a reasonable and effective way
to bring the issue before the courts”.12 As a result, despite the fact that
individual sex trade workers could challenge the legislation when faced
with prosecution and notwithstanding the ongoing litigation brought by
sex trade workers in Ontario,13 the Court permitted a public interest
group whose object was to improve the lot of female sex trade workers
to challenge Criminal Code14 provisions dealing with different aspects
of prostitution.
The tone and tenor of Downtown Eastside is significant. It
recognizes that “in a constitutional democracy … there are occasions
when public interest litigation is an appropriate vehicle to bring matters
of public interest and importance before the courts”.15 Traditional
9

Id., at 252.
Downtown Eastside, supra, note 4.
11
Id., at para. 20.
12
Id., at para. 37.
13
Canada (Attorney General) v. Bedford, [2012] O.J. No. 1296, 109 O.R. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.),
leave to appeal granted [2012] S.C.C.A. No. 159 (S.C.C.).
14
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46.
15
Downtown Eastside, supra, note 4, at para. 22.
10
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standing rules discouraging constitutional litigation are replaced with
an emphasis on a principle of legality that facilitates the litigation of
arguable constitutional claims, welcomes public interest litigants and
takes into account the practical realities that make suits by individual
litigants problematic. While maintaining the need for a three-factor test
to filter claims brought by litigants lacking a personal legal interest in
the outcome, the Supreme Court appears to have significantly
broadened the filter’s gage and thereby increased access to Charter
justice for public interest litigants by permitting claims to proceed
where the proposed suit is a reasonable and effective way to bring the
issue before the courts.
Implicit in the judgment is the view that Charter litigation should be
encouraged and viewed in a positive light, as being in the public interest.
Where necessary, traditional procedural rules designed to discourage
litigation should be reassessed and, where appropriate, reformulated to
ensure access to Charter justice.

II. COSTS
Like the traditional rules for standing, traditional costs rules tend to
discourage rather than encourage litigation. If applied without
moderation to public interest litigants, the civil justice costs regime
represents a significant impediment. Public interest litigants tend to be
poorly funded. They are often dependent upon the efforts of pro bono or
poorly paid counsel and rarely have any prospect of a monetary award
from which a contingency fee can be paid, even if successful. Their
opponents, in contrast, are usually well-funded and determined
governments. If the lack of means to start the suit is not enough, the
threat of an adverse costs award if the case fails can be a powerful
disincentive to launch the case in the first place.
Our traditional costs rules are designed to foster three
fundamental purposes: (1) to indemnify successful litigants for the
cost of litigation; (2) to encourage settlements; and (3) to discourage
frivolous suits and sanction inappropriate behaviour by litigants.16
These rules and the purposes they foster work best where the interests
involved in the litigation are essentially those of private parties in pursuit
of remedies that have a monetary value. The winner should receive
16

See Fong v. Chan, [1999] O.J. No. 4600, 46 O.R. (3d) 330, at para. 22 (Ont. C.A.).
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partial compensation for the cost of the litigation as a matter of simple
justice. Settlements are considered to be desirable and are encouraged
by the offer to settle regime that rewards parties who are willing to
compromise their claims and punishes parties who refuse to accept
reasonable offers. Finally, cost rules provide a disciplinary tool that
courts can deploy to discourage frivolous suits and to sanction
inappropriate behaviour by litigants.
How well do these rules and the purposes they foster fit the model of
Charter litigation?17 First, the interests involved are not usually those of
private parties in pursuit of monetary remedies. Financial incentives seem
to be misplaced as Charter issues and Charter remedies involve the interest
of the public at large. It is not evident that the indemnification rationale
holds. Moreover, there is a lack of symmetry of resources as between the
public interest rights seekers and government defenders. Second, the
encouragement of settlements rationale is, at best, an awkward fit as
Charter claims are not ordinarily susceptible to compromise. Of the three
purposes that emerge from the private litigation model, only the behaviour
control rationale seems to apply.
Judicial recognition of the inherent differences between Charter
litigation and the private litigation model that fostered the traditional
regime of cost rules may be leading us to a different and distinctive
pattern of cost rules for Charter litigation. If this distinctive pattern
continues to develop and evolve, it could have a significant impact in
making Charter justice more accessible. When considered together with
the more liberal standing rule announced in Downtown Eastside, we may
have the seeds of a distinctive approach to traditional procedural rules for
Charter cases that encourages access to Charter justice. I examine some
of these developments below.

17
While I am reluctant to cite myself, I do so here to demonstrate that I have already taken
a position on these issues in my judicial capacity. See Mahar v. Rogers Cablesystems Ltd., [1995]
O.J. No. 3035, 25 O.R. (3d) 690, at 704-705 (Ont. Gen. Div.):
... The incentives and disincentives created by costs rules assume that the parties are primarily motivated by the pursuit of their own private and financial interests. An
unrelenting application of those rules to public interest litigants will have the result of
significantly limiting access to the courts by such litigants. Such a consequence would be
undesirable with respect to proceedings such as the present one which was, in my view,
brought on a bona fide basis and which raised a genuine issue of law of significance to
the public at large.
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1. Advance Costs
Advance costs orders in Charter litigation represent a significant departure from the traditional rule that cost awards are made at the end of a
trial on the loser-pays principle. In the leading case, British Columbia
(Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band,18 the Supreme Court
recognized the need “to ensure that ordinary citizens have access to the
justice system when they seek to resolve matters of consequence to the
community as a whole”, but emphasized that an award of advance costs
is discretionary.19 The Court outlined three conditions that must be
present before such costs are ordered:
(1) The party seeking interim costs genuinely cannot afford to pay for
the litigation, and no other realistic option exists for bringing the
issues to trial.
(2) The claim to be adjudicated is prima facie meritorious.
(3) The issues raised transcend the individual interests of the particular
litigant, are of public importance, and have not been resolved in
previous cases.
To date, advance costs orders have been essentially limited to
Aboriginal20 and language rights claims.21 In fact, subsequent cases
suggest that advance costs orders are the exception rather than the rule.
For example, in Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada
(Commissioner of Customs and Revenue),22 the Court emphasized that
advance costs are a rare and exceptional remedy of last resort and
insisted upon a narrow definition of public interest. The applicant must
show that the claim asserted affects a significant sector of the public and
that it would be virtually impossible to litigate the case without an
advance costs award.
Advance costs may be rare, but these cases do establish an important
point of principle. As with the standing jurisprudence, they demonstrate a
judicial recognition of the need to rethink the automatic application of
traditional procedural rules to public interest Charter litigation.

18
19
20
21
22

[2003] S.C.J. No. 76, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 371, at para. 40 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 27.
See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., R. v. Caron, [2011] S.C.J. No. 5, [2011] S.C.R. 78 (S.C.C.).
[2007] S.C.J. No. 2, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 38, at paras. 38-41 (S.C.C.).
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2. The “Loser-Pays” Rule: Awarding Costs against an
Unsuccessful Charter Applicant
Should the ordinary “loser-pays” rule apply to unsuccessful Charter
applicants? Courts, including the Supreme Court, have certainly awarded
costs in the government’s favour against unsuccessful Charter applicants.23
In contrast, legal scholars,24 law reform commission reports25 and
even some judges26 have called for a “one-way” cost rule whereby public
interest litigants may recover costs if successful but are not subject to an
adverse costs award if they lose. While the jurisprudence on the point is
unsettled, it seems that, as a practical matter, the “loser-pays” rule is no
longer routinely applied. Successful governments often do not ask for
costs in Charter litigation. This, I suspect, flows from a recognition that
the public interest is served by Charter litigation, even where the claim
fails. Moreover, even when sought, costs are not invariably ordered
against unsuccessful Charter litigants. The indemnity rationale that underlies the traditional rule is considerably weaker where the government
is the successful litigant.27 To the extent that current practice removes or
alleviates the threat of an adverse costs award, access to Charter justice is
clearly enhanced.
On the other hand, an argument can certainly be made that some threat
of an adverse costs order should remain to discourage frivolous claims and
23
See, e.g., Operation Dismantle Inc. v. Canada, [1985] S.C.J. No. 22, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441
(S.C.C.); R.J.R.-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] S.C.J. No. 17, [1994]
1 S.C.R. 311 (S.C.C.).
24
See, e.g., Raj Anand & Ian G. Scott, “Financing Public Participation in Environmental
Decision Making” (1982) 60 Can. Bar Rev. 81, at 114-15; Lara Friedlander, “Costs and the Public
Interest Litigant” (1995) 40 McGill L.J. 55, at 74-77, 97-100; Chris Tollefson, “When the ‘Public
Interest’ Loses: The Liability of Public Interest Litigants for Adverse Costs Awards” (1995)
29 U.B.C. L. Rev. 303, at 309-14; Chris Tollefson, Darlene Gilliland & Jerry DeMarco, “Towards a
Costs Jurisprudence in Public Interest Litigation” (2004) 83 Can. Bar Rev. 473, at 484-87; and
Chris Tollefson, “Costs in Public Interest Litigation Revisited” (2011) 39 Adv. Q. 197.
25
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on the Law of Standing (Toronto: Ministry of
the Attorney General, 1989).
26
In Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76, at para. 69 (S.C.C.), McLachlin C.J.C. departed from
normal court rules, finding that the Foundation “brought an important issue of constitutional and
criminal law that was not otherwise capable of coming before the Court. This justifies deviating
from the normal costs rule and supports an order that both parties bear their own costs throughout.”
In Incredible Electronics Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2006] O.J. No. 2155, 80 O.R. (3d) 723
(Ont. S.C.J.), after an extensive review of the case law and literature, Perell J. concluded that
genuine public interest litigants should not be subject to the usual loser-pays rule.
27
See St. James’ Preservation Society v. Toronto (City), [2006] O.J. No. 2726, 272 D.L.R.
(4th) 149 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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to sanction inappropriate behaviour by Charter litigants. Both in the
Charter context and elsewhere, making pro bono parties subject to the
ordinary cost consequences in litigation ensures that parties do not abuse
the system and also promotes access to justice by enabling and
encouraging more lawyers to volunteer to work pro bono in deserving
cases.28
One solution might be to consider the English remedy of a “protective costs order” in favour of public interest litigants.29 These orders
parallel, but are more modest than advance costs orders. The purpose of a
protective costs order is to allow claimants of limited means access to the
court in order to advance their case without the fear of an order for substantial costs being made against them, a fear which would inhibit them
from continuing with the case at all.30
3. Costs for an Unsuccessful Charter Applicant
While the cases are rare, the Supreme Court has recognized that even
an unsuccessful Charter applicant may be entitled to costs. For example, in
Schachter v. Canada,31 the Court awarded costs to a plaintiff who won at
trial on an innovative section 15 issue but ultimately lost on appeal on a
remedial issue after the Crown conceded the section 15 violation. Similarly, in B. (R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto,32 the
Court upheld an order requiring the government-funded defendant to pay
the costs of unsuccessful Charter litigants who challenged a compulsory
blood transfusion for their child on grounds of religion. The order was said
to be “highly unusual” and something to be permitted “only in very rare

28
In 1465778 Ontario Inc. v. 1122077 Ontario Ltd., [2006] O.J. No. 4248, 82 O.R. (3d)
757 (Ont. C.A.), a non-Charter case, Feldman J.A. held that pro bono counsel could recover costs
when successful but that pro bono litigants could also have costs awarded against them.
29
See R. (on the application of Corner House Research) v. Secretary of State for Trade &
Industry, [2005] EWCA Civ. 192, [2005] 4 All E.R. 1 (C.A.).
30
Id., at para. 74. Such an order may be made where the court is satisfied that:
i) The issues raised are of general public importance;
ii) The public interest requires that those issues should be resolved;
iii) The applicant has no private interest in the outcome of the case;
iv) Having regard to the financial resources of the applicant and the respondent(s) and to the
amount of costs that are likely to be involved it is fair and just to make the order; and
v) If the order is not made the applicant will probably discontinue the proceedings and
will be acting reasonably in so doing.
31
[1992] S.C.J. No. 68, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.).
32
[1994] S.C.J. No. 4, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315 (S.C.C.).
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cases”,33 but again, it rests on the recognition that Charter challenges, even
those that are unsuccessful, often provide clarification on issues that affect
a broad spectrum of the public and are therefore not to be discouraged.
4. Enhanced Costs for a Successful Charter Applicant
Successful Charter litigants, like all other successful litigants, generally receive their costs on a partial indemnity basis. Nevertheless, full
indemnity costs have been awarded where there has been misconduct by
the government defendant.34 In Victoria (City) v. Adams,35 the British
Columbia Court of Appeal drew on the Supreme Court’s advance cost
jurisprudence to award costs on an enhanced scale, identifying four factors to consider when determining whether special costs should be
awarded to a successful public interest litigant:
(a) The case involves matters of public importance that transcend the
immediate interests of the named parties, and which have not been
previously resolved;
(b) The successful party has no personal, proprietary or pecuniary
interest in the outcome of the litigation that would justify the
proceeding economically;
(c) As between the parties, the unsuccessful party has a superior
capacity to bear the costs of the proceeding; and
(d) The successful party has not conducted the litigation in an abusive,
36
vexatious or frivolous manner.

5. Costs as a Section 24(1) Remedy in Criminal Cases
Costs generally do not follow the event in criminal cases. The award
of costs on indictable offences is specifically prohibited, but costs may be
allowed on summary conviction appeals.37 The Supreme Court has
33

Id., at 390.
See Winters v. British Columbia (Legal Services Society), [1999] S.C.J. No. 49, [1999]
3 S.C.R. 16 (S.C.C.); Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance), [2002] S.C.J. No. 13, [2002]
1 S.C.R. 405 (S.C.C.).
35
[2009] B.C.J. No. 2451, 313 D.L.R. (4th) 29 (B.C.C.A.) [hereinafter “Victoria (City)”].
Compare Quebec (Education, Recreation and Sports) v. Nguyen, [2009] S.C.J. No. 47, [2009]
3 S.C.R. 208 (S.C.C.).
36
Victoria (City), id., at para. 188.
37
Criminal Code, ss. 683(3), 826.
34
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awarded costs as a section 24(1) Charter remedy in criminal and quasicriminal cases. For example, in R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc.,38 the Court
upheld a costs order in a case where the Crown had failed to make
adequate disclosure. Chief Justice McLachlin stated that such an award,
“while not without a compensatory element”, was “intended as a means
of disciplining and discouraging flagrant and unjustified incidents of
non-disclosure”39 and explained that costs awards are restricted “at a
minimum, to circumstances of a marked and unacceptable departure from
the reasonable standards expected of the prosecution”.40 Clearly, the
emphasis on state misconduct restricts the availability of such an award.41
Professor Roach argues that there is much to be said for a more
flexible standard for awarding costs that is not limited to flagrant
violations.42 When an individual’s Charter rights are infringed, it is
important he or she have a forum for vindicating those rights, even if
the infringement was unintentional. By depriving a party of his or her
costs because there was no state misconduct or because the Charter
breach is not rare or unique, a person may be left with no avenue for
vindicating his or her rights. Roach suggests that the test governing
Charter damages enunciated in Vancouver (City) v. Ward,43 could be
used to justify a section 24(1) award of damages to reflect the costs of
litigation.44
38

[2001] S.C.J. No. 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 (S.C.C.).
Id., at para. 81.
40
Id., at para. 87.
41
In R. v. Tiffin, [2008] O.J. No. 1525, 90 O.R. (3d) 575, at para. 98 (Ont. C.A.) (citations
omitted), LaForme J.A. summarized the law as follows:
Costs, however, will not be routinely ordered in favour of accused persons whose
Charter rights have been violated. In my view, the jurisdiction to award costs against the
Crown as a s. 24(1) remedy for a Charter breach in cases not involving Crown
misconduct requires something that is “rare” or “unique” that “must at least result in
something akin to an extreme hardship on the defendant.” As a general rule, costs
claimed by an accused, absent Crown misconduct, will not be an “appropriate and just”
Charter remedy[.]
42
Roach, supra, note * [p. 3], at para. 11.840.
43
[2010] S.C.J. No. 27, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Ward”].
44
Roach, supra, note * [p. 3], at para. 11.1310. The Court in Ward, id., at para. 4 set out
four requirements:
1. First, the claimant must establish that a Charter right has been breached.
2. Second, the claimant shows why damages are a just and appropriate remedy, having
regard to whether they would fulfil one or more of the related functions of compensation, vindication of the right and/or deterrence of future breaches.
3. Third, the burden shifts to the state to show that countervailing factors defeat the
functional considerations that support a damage award and render damages inappropriate or unjust.
39

(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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III. CONCLUSION
The jurisprudence on costs in Charter cases appears to be in a state of
flux. While the courts have certainly recognized in principle that it may
be necessary to modify traditional costs rules to meet the needs of Charter litigation, the break with traditional rules to award advance costs,
enhanced costs, costs in favour of unsuccessful Charter litigants, and
costs as a section 24(1) remedy in criminal cases, has been described as
exceptional and rare. On the other hand, the loser-pays rule appears not
to be applied with any degree of rigour and we may well be evolving into
a “one-way” costs regime under which public interest litigants are not
required to pay costs if they lose but can recover partial indemnity costs
if they win.
It remains to be seen whether the same spirit that motivated the
Supreme Court in Downtown Eastside to reformulate the rules relating to
public interest standing will lead the courts to make what has been
described as exceptional in the realm of costs more routine.

4. Fourth, if the state fails to negate that the award is appropriate and just, the quantum
of damages is determined by ensuring that the award of damages represents a meaningful response to the seriousness of the breach and the objectives of s. 24(1)
damages.

